Philosophy and Method.....
As David Chalmers (
here) and Carrie Jenkins (
here) mention, a draft of Tim Williamson's Hempel Lectures is available
on-line as what looks like a book manuscript. I haven't read it all or anything (although the material is pretty familiar), but these questions of methodology and approach are deeply interesting. Williamson advocates "armchair philosophy" and thinks that we should not see a philosophical theory as stagnant simply because we haven't done any corresponding experimental leg-work - we can push a philosophical theory a long way by being appropriately rigorous and patient in our conceptual work. My own opinion is that in lots of questions we really should be looking to empirical and experimental work to inform and guide our philosophy, and indeed, Tim Williamson and Jason Stanley's paper "Knowing How" provides just the kind of model of philosophy that I like - an important philosophical question gets pushed, strained, and put right with the use of some Linguistic work on interrogatives. But of course, this need not be at odds with what Williamson is saying, since his main ire is directed at the kind of approach we see with Experimental Philosophy, whereby we try to do some experiment to get at our pre-theoretic intuitions, and then lead the philosophical theory towards that. (Or as Williamson describes the methodlogy: "conducting opinion polls amongst non-philosophers"). What I really like about Williamson's armchair philosophy though is not just its insistence on rigour, persistence, and patience in using our philosophical methods, but that we must embrace an accompanying intellectual honesty in evaluating how far we have fulfilled the requirements of good philosophical work. Like I say, questions of methodology interest me, so I hope I find time to read through it all properly quite soon.
4 comments:
I am afraid I haven't yet had the chance to read this manuscript and I have no doubt there will be much I will agree with in it---who cannot be impressed with Williamson? I suppose my study of Hegel has made me suspicious of armchair-only philosophy. Hegel sat in his armchair and had a peek at what was going on around him. Perhaps at the very least he presents us with the limits of such a method (say, for art or politics). Or maybe not. What I've liked about experimental philosophy is that, in part, it looks to the vast majority of people in this world who are not philosophers. When we look to learn more about "ourselves," are we trying to learn more about human beings or only those who study philosophy? I imagine we all agree that philosophers don't hold all the cards and we all agree on rigour, etc. I can see objections to experimental philosophy when the experiment and not the philosophy is doing "the work," as it were. However, I still find myself interested in it. Thus, for example, perhaps when legislatures make new proposals for varying criminal sanctions. The fact that (a) most don't know what they are and/or (b) those persons most likely to commit said offences might well live in an environment where others are not law-abiding and would know the very low likelihood (single digits) of arrest, conviction, and imprisonment. Both (a) and (b) mitigate against deterrence. Both factors are empirical facts, not something we can come up with a priori, as it were. Experience --pragmatists of the world unite! ;o)-- and empirical work can help us make our philosophizing more rigorous by more closely linking it to the world we live in. So here I like experimental uses---and I am thinking of a piece on deterrence in particular--although, again, I am also sympathetic to the views that (a) armchair philosophy isn't all bad and (b) experimental philosophy sometimes moves too far away from the salient theoretical considerations.
P.S. Glad to see "live" again!
Thom - thanks for the comment (and the mention on The Carnival!). I think you're right that Experimental Philosophy is interesting (it certainly interests me anyway) but I do often wonder what it's doing or quite what ambitions it has for itself.
I also think you raise an interesting point about such issues in the philosophy of law. I suppose the issue for you is that creating criminal sanctions with deterents that feel real and tangible seems to be an empirical and "experimental" question. Agreed. But my guess is that whether we should ask the people we want to deter what would deter them in our attempt to generate worthwhile sanctions is an altogether different question, and perhaps the kind that Williamson has in mind.
I agree entirely with what you say. One is suspicious of its ambitions. I find some of its work relevant to my interests with philosophy of punishment although perhaps such a field is more agreeable to the kinds of work experimental philosophy engages in than other areas. It does point to different questions than what you raise, as you note. And so I'm vaguely agreeable to it, although not yet convinced. It will certainly be interesting to see how it develops....
I know I come two years late to comment on this post, but I would have loved to see your discussion taking another way instead of evaluating a position on philosophical methodologies by collateral virtues such as rigour or democratic enhanceability or the like.
Probably, now that Philosophy of Philosophy has been published you had time to read it and form to yourself a thoughtful opinion about it.
Thanks. (Greetings from Mexico...)
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